THAT Soliloquy — Is It About Suicide?

“To be, or not to be—that is the question …”

… but what is the question, really? What is Hamlet actually talking about? I was pretty slow as a teenager, so when I asked a high school English teacher this question, of course he told me, as teachers always do …

Hamlet is contemplating suicide.”

The trouble was, I couldn’t quite make sense of it. Yes, I understood what all the words meant—that “quietus” was a settlement of a debt, a “bare bodkin” was a dagger, “fardels” were burdens or loads, the “undiscover’d country” was death, and all the rest of it.

First Folio, 1623

First Folio, 1623

But wasn’t taking “arms against a sea of troubles” a rather odd way of describing suicide? And what about those “enterprises of great pitch and moment” that “lose the name of action” that Hamlet talks about at the end? Surely, I suggested, Hamlet wasn’t talking about suicide there.

I succeeded only in convincing my English teacher that I was a great deal dumber than he already knew me to be. And who was I to argue? I let the matter rest for a long time.

It wasn’t until many years later that I discovered the 1982 Arden edition of Hamlet, edited by the late Shakespeare scholar Harold Jenkins. Thirty years in the making, it was so exhaustively (and exhaustingly) annotated that Jenkins couldn’t fit all of his annotations on the pages of the text itself; he added another 150 pages of notes at the end. It was a dream for a Shakespeare geek like me. I devoured every word.

And when I got to that all-too-famous soliloquy of Act III, scene i, I was in for a special treat. The speech was annotated first with about a page and a half of footnotes, then with another eight and a half pages of endnotes—a total of around 10 pages of annotation altogether.

To my delight, I found that Jenkins devoted most of those notes to proving my high school teacher (and just about everybody else) wrong …

It is impossible … to say that Hamlet ever contemplates suicide for himself or regards it as a likely choice for any man.

For one thing, this is the only soliloquy of Hamlet’s (out of seven in all) that never once uses first person singular pronouns like “I” and “me.” Nor does he mention his father’s murder, his uncle’s usurpation, his mother’s remarriage, or anything else having to do with the story of the play. Hamlet isn’t talking about his own specific situation at all, but about what life is like for all of us.

And his “question,” as Jenkins sums it up, is simply, “Is life worth living?” Hamlet goes on to give us a lot of reasons why life might not be …

… the whips and scorns of time,
Th’oppressor’s wrong, the proud man’s contumely,
The pangs of dispriz’d love, the law’s delay,
The insolence of office, and the spurns
That patient merit of th’unworthy takes …

And of course, right then Hamlet does mention the possibility of suicide—after all, one could always do oneself in with a “bare bodkin.” But according to Jenkins,

this is a rhetorical question, which already presupposes its answer, a hypothetical question brought in only to be dismissed.

It’s the same with just about any positive action we might take. We don’t wind up doing much of anything about life’s “sea of troubles.”

And according to Jenkins, that “sea” is a richer image than we may have realized:

Edwin Both as Hamlet, ca. 1870

Edwin Booth as Hamlet, ca. 1870

The metaphor appears to be based upon well-known instances, notably that of the Celts, who, as described by various ancient authors, rather than show fear by flight, would draw their swords and throw themselves into the tides as though to terrify them.

A desperate and futile gesture, certainly. You could even call it suicidal, since it’s surely not going to end well. But suicide isn’t really the point. It’s about doing something—anything—against the manifold torments of existence. It’s also about accepting the fact that you’re doomed to lose—or at the very least to die in the attempt. Hamlet learns this bitter truth himself at the end of the play.

Most of us don’t dare undertake any such endeavor, in no small part due to our fear of the “undiscover’d country” of death …

Thus conscience does make cowards of us all,
And thus the native hue of resolution
Is sicklied o’er with the pale cast of thought,
And enterprises of great pitch and moment
With this regard their currents turn awry
And lose the name of action.

As Jenkins puts it,

we come to the end of life’s “troubles” not when we put an end to them but when they put an end to us.

Intimations of Immortality

I find myself reflecting on mortality these days—wondering as we all do whether the elusive entity that we call “self” survives the death of the body. One of the most tantalizing suggestions I’ve heard comes from psychologist and neuroscientist Stephen Kosslyn. Back in 2005, he was asked this question:

“What do you believe is true even though you cannot prove it?”

His answer really intrigued me:

Your mind may arise not simply from your own brain, but in part from the brains of other people.

Sobo_1909_624Kosslyn’s explanation is simple and utterly non-mystical. To sum it up crudely, your mind is not entirely self-contained within your skull. In order to perform certain complicated mental tasks, you must extend the limits of your physical brain with “prosthetic systems”—for example, an electronic calculator to multiply 756 by 312, which is rather difficult to do in your head.

As it happens, people perform this very same function for one another. Human beings set up what Kosslyn calls “Social Prosthetic Systems” (SPSs) in which people share their brainpower to solve countless challenges. A marriage might be the most sophisticated SPS of all—a relationship in which two people are constantly (and quite literally) sharing brains. As Kosslyn puts it,

parts of other people’s brains come to serve as extensions of your own brain. And if the mind is “what the brain does,” then your mind in fact arises from the activity of not only your own brain, but those of your SPSs.

Kosslyn isn’t blind to the enormous implications of this idea:

In fact, one could even argue that when your body dies, part of your mind may survive.

Cognitive scientist Douglas Hofstadter has expressed much the same notion:

You can imagine a soul as being a detailed, elaborate pattern that exists very clearly in one brain. When a person dies, the original is no longer around. But there are other versions of it in other people’s brains. It’s a less detailed copy, it’s coarse-grained.

This concept of life after death might strike you as painfully prosaic. It’s certainly a far cry from Wordsworth’s belief in a soul that not only survives the death of the body, but has existed always:

Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting:
The Soul that rises with us, our life’s Star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting,
And cometh from afar:
Not in entire forgetfulness,
And not in utter nakedness,
But trailing clouds of glory do we come
From God, who is our home …

I’m open to such sentiments, which harmonize well with mainstream religious and mystical beliefs. But the simplicity and earthiness of Kosslyn’s idea holds a certain beauty for me. And I don’t seem to be alone in feeling this way.

After Hofstadter’s wife, Carol, died in 1993 at the age of 42, he experienced an epiphany while looking at her picture one day. In his book I Am A Strange Loop, Hofstadter describes how he was overcome with the realization that Carol’s soul and his own had fused “into one higher-level entity” shaped out of shared hopes and dreams for their children. Their hopes

were not separate or distinct hopes but were just one hope, one clear thing that defined us both, that wielded us into a unit, the kind of unit I had but dimly imagined before being married and having children. I realized that though Carol had died, that core piece of her had not died at all, but that it had lived on very determinedly in my brain.

That sounds to me like a kind of immortality well worth hoping for.